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With Obergefell v. Hodges, the Supreme Court declared that same-sex
marriages must be recognized throughout the United States, the same as
marriages between a man and a woman.[2] In a scathing dissent, Justice
Antonin Scalia commented that the majority opinion was distinctly light on
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theory—in his words, “lacking even a thin veneer of law.”[3] The crux of
Scalia’s dissent depended on the representation of the majority’s opinion as
surpassing the power of the Court, as superseding the legislature, and “as
pretentious as its content is egotistic.”[4] This opinion is not uncommon and
is shared by some who may approve of the result.[5]
Despite this, Obergefell does not represent a blip in Supreme Court history,
detached from precedent. Between the “silly extravagances,”[6] Justice
Kennedy’s majority opinion does lay out the rationale for the Court’s ruling,
including an iteration of relevant case law.[7] Citing Lawrence v. Texas,
United States v. Windsor, and Griswold v. Connecticut—among others—
Kennedy asserts that this opinion is in keeping not just with the expectations
of the public, but also with the Court’s precedent. [8]
Regarding the historical line of cases about fundamental rights, some might
note the quotation of Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe v. Ullman as
representing a departure from the majority thread of past opinions.[9] This
could act as a signal indicating a shift away from the main line of thought on
unenumerated fundamental rights: the quote itself is largely for  avor but its
inclusion is purposeful. Kennedy also cites Washington v. Glucksberg, an
integral case in the consideration of unenumerated rights.[10] As the
majority observes, Glucksberg recognized that substantive due process
analysis has two primary features: the Due Process Clause protects those
rights that are (1) “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” and (2)
required for both liberty and justice.[11] As the Obergefell majority notes, the
petitioners invoked Glucksberg to question what they termed the “new and
nonexistent ‘right to same-sex marriage’.”[12] Asserting the issue in this way
begs the question, as the majority points out.[13] Loving v. Virginia did not
concern “the right to interracial marriage,” nor did Turner v. Sa ey ask
whether there was a right to “inmate marriage,” nor Zablocki v. Redhail the
“right of fathers with unpaid child support duties to marry.”[14] Each case
concerned the right to marry and whether there was su cient justi cation
for the burden or exclusion from the right.
Loving is, in many ways, a good comparison case for Obergefell. Loving
reestablished the importance of marriage in the United States, and that there
is no valid reason to keep two people of different races from being able to
marry simply due to their races.[15] Loving holds that while marriage is
generally subject to the state’s police power, that police power does not
override the Fourteenth Amendment.[16] A unanimous Court decided Loving,
and few  nd fault with its holding.[17] Upholding the right of same-sex
couples to marry stands in the same tradition that decided Loving. In the vein
of Loving, Obergefell does not “create” a right to same-sex marriage, but
rather rea rms the importance of marriage in the United States, both today
and historically, ensuring that people are not barred from marriage without a
su ciently compelling reason. The fact that the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment might not have contemplated same-sex marriage has as much
meaning as the fact that those same drafters might not have intended for the
amendment to make anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional—what
matters is the “broader, organic purpose” of the amendment.[18]
The fact that the writing in the majority opinion tends towards the more  orid
does not diminish the weight of the legal theory it espouses. Justice Scalia
argues that a majority opinion should not be prone to such  ights of fancy as
those found in Kennedy’s majority opinion.[19] Scalia’s opinion assumes that
no other majority opinion has ever been written with an eye for legacy or
more  owery turns of phrase. Judge Richard Posner compares different
opinion writing styles to historic poets, saying, “no one I suppose considers
Shakespeare . . . inferior to Tennyson. They are merely different.”[20] The
writing style is, at worst, an annoyance, that in no way detracts from the legal
rationale itself.
Scalia alleges that Obergefell creates a fundamental right in the Fourteenth
Amendment that the great legal minds of their day never found.[21] His
dissent assumes that these legal thinkers “overlooked” the right that the
majority creates,[22] when the reality is that these thinkers can hardly have
overlooked a question they were never asked. Upon being asked, the
Supreme Court of the United States rea rmed the importance of equal
protection and marriage. 
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